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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
A.\~IE M. CARPENTER, 
Appellant, 
-vs-
RUBY SYRETT, 
Respondent. 
I 
\ 
Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action was commenced by the appellant against 
the respondent to recover damages for personal injuries 
sustained by appellant resulting from a fall down the 
stairway leading from the second story to the ground 
floor of the building owned and operated by respondent, 
known as Ruby's Inn, which is located about four miles 
north of Bryce Canyon in Garfield County, State of 
Utah. 
The mn is a two story building with a stairway 
leading from the lobby to the second floor. The stairs 
leading from the lobby go north for a few steps, then 
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run east to the landing on the second floor, there being 
more steps from the landing to the top than from the 
lobby to the landing. The hall at the top of the stairs is 
approximately four feet in width and there are rooms 
along this hallway on either side at the t9p of the stairs. 
The stairs enter the hallway at right angles near the 
north end of the hall. The hall is so contructed that 
natural light lights the hall from a glass door on the 
north end of the hall and from a glass panel in the 
door in the south end of the hall, also what light comes 
into the hall from the rooms along the side of the hall. 
The stairs from the bottom to the top of the first story 
are lighted by natural light from the lobby of the inn. 
The electric lights were turned out part of the time during 
the day because they were not necessary, but when the 
electric lights were out in the daytime there was suf-
ficient light on the stairs for a person to go up and 
down the stairs and the steps could be seen at such 
time. 
From the 21st to the 25th day of August, 1937, the 
appellant was a registered guest at said inn. On the 
25th day of August, 1937, at about 8:30 A. M. appellant 
left her room on the second floor and walked along the 
hall in a northerly direction to the stairs. When the 
plaintiff started down the stairs she fell and sustained 
. . . 
severe InJUries. 
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5 
"fhe appellant had been ill and 1·e1nained in bed 
the entire day and night prior to the accident aoo on 
the morning of the accident she ,~;ent to the head of 
the stairs and started do"?n "?ithout stopping or looking. 
The appellant had never noticed the lighting in the 
hall or ~tairs and on the morning in question she did 
not see any electric lights burning in the hall. 
The appellant's claim for damages against the 
respondent is based "-holly on the theory that the re-
spondent negligently caused or let the light go out . 
thereby causing the appellant to fall and sustain the 
injuries complained of. The respondent maintained that 
there was no evidence of negligence in the maintenance 
and operation of the electric lighting system, nor that 
appellant's injury was in any way a result of respond-
ent's negligence, and that there was no showing that 
electric lights were necessary at the time of the accident. 
The respondent also contends that the appellant was 
guilty of contributory negligence. 
ARGUMENT 
The respondent contends that the court was under 
a duty to grant the defendant's motion for a non-suit for 
three reasons: 
1. The appellant has failed to show that the de-
fe~dant was under any duty to maintain electric lights 
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6 
in the hall or on the stairs at the time the injuries were 
sustained by the plaintiff. 
2. The appellant has failed to show or prove any 
causal connection between the injuries suffered and the 
negligence of the plaintiff. 
3. The appellant was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 
PROPOSITION NUMBER ONE: 
The respondent was not under any duty to main .. 
tain electric lights on the stairs or in the hall at the 
time the appellant fell and suffered the injuries com-
plained of. 
An innkeeper is not an insurer of the safety of his 
guests, but must exercise reasonable care for their safety, 
comfort, and entertainment. 
Quinn vs. Utah Gas and Coke Co., 42 Utah 113, 
129 Pac. 362. 
32 C. J. 561, Sec. 69. 
Baker et al, vs. Dallas Hotel Company, 73 Fed. 
2nd. 825. 
DeHoney vs. Harding, 300 Fed. 696. 
Applying that rule, let us consider the evidence with 
respect to the respondent's duty to maintain electric 
lights at the time of the appellant's fall. 
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~\rt L. C'arpenter. a "·itness for the plaintiff, and 
incidentally a SlHl of the appellant, and a discharged 
employee of the respondent testified in regard to the 
condition of the light in the hall and on the stairs as 
follo,,~s: That the stairs "·ere dark without the use of 
artificial lig-ht, but that in the daytime he ascended and 
descended the stairs ''?ithout difficulty and that he could 
see where he ,,-as going. (Tr. 58, ~\h. 16) and that there 
were doors "-ith glass panels at the north and the south 
end of the hall (Tr. 55~ A.b. 14) that the lights from the 
lobby were sufficient· to light the lower part of the 
stairs, and that there was nothing to obstruct this light 
up to the second floor level, thus leaving the stairs 
lighted by natural light from the lobby of the inn· with 
the exception of those steps lying in the shadow of the 
floor of the second story. {Tr. 59, 60, Ab. 16) 
Maihen Johnson~ a witness for the appellant and 
the former mechanic in charge of the lighting system 
testified as follows in regard to the condition of the 
lighting on the stairs. 
Q. ''rere you on those stairs when there were no 
electric lights on? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What was the condition of the light at that 
time? 
A. Well the light from the top down as near as 
I can remember is better than the light from 
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. the bottom up, for the reason that the light 
from the lobby shows in from the bottom, 
and coming up the shadow of your person 
naturally abstracts some of the light, but I 
have gone up there as fast as I could walk 
and go down and there wasn't any light. 
Q. And were you there when the electric lights 
were not on? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What could you see in the way of visibility 
when the electric lights were not on, on the 
stairs? 
A. I could distinctly see every step from the top 
down without any difficulty. (Tr. 79, 80, 
81, Ab. 24, 25.) 
He also testified that the lights were turned out 
In the daytime when they were not necessary to run 
appliances. (Tr. 82, Ab. 25.) 
The evidence as above referred to shows that the 
stairs were sufficiently well lighted by means of natural 
light to eliminate any necessity or duty on the part of 
the respondent to maintain electric lights at the time of 
the accident for the following reasons: 
1. The hall was lighted from both ends by reason 
of glass doo~s in either end. There was a sufficient 
amount of natural light coming from the glass ~oors at 
each end of the hall to adequately light the hall. 
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9 
) The stairs "Tere lighted 'vith light emi.nating from 
the lobby. to such an extent that each step was clearly 
visible. 
3. That the stairs were so , .. Tell lighted by natural 
light that it , .. ~as not necessary to have the artificial lights 
on in the daytime. 
The trial court, therefore, acted propertly in grant-
ing the non-suit upon this point for the reason that the 
appellant failed to show that the respondent was under 
any duty to maintain electric lights on the stairs at the 
time of the accident. but on the contrary, the appellant 
has affirmatively shown that he was not under a duty 
to maintain electric lights at such time and place. 
PROPOSITIO:X i\'UMBER TWO: 
The appellant has failed to show or prove any causal 
connection between the injuries suffered and the negli-
gence of the plaintiff. 
In an action for damages for negligence 
where the evidence entirely fails to connect the 
negligence with the fact of the accident, the 
court, should direct the jury that the plaintiff 
cannot recover. 
Thompson on Trials-Vol. 2, 2nd Edition, Page 1257, Sec. 
1678. 
In the case of Goater vs. Klotz, a Pennsylvania case, 
reported at 124 Atl. 83, the court held as follows: 
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"1,he court cannot take a case from the jury, 
as a matter of law, on the ground that no proper 
finding can he reached, unless the evidence is so 
conflicting that any verdict would he a mere 
guess, hut where the burden is on plaintiff to 
establish certain facts, and his testimony is so 
contradictory as to present no basis for a finding, 
except as a mere conjecture, a non-suit is properly 
entered." 
In the case of Quinn vs. the Utah Gas and Coke 
Company, reported in 42 Utah 113, 129 Pac. 362, and on 
page 119 of that case the court stated as follows: 
"When a plaintiff produces evidence that is 
consistent with an hypothesis that the defendant 
is not negligent, and also with one that he is, 
his proof tends to show neither." 
The appellant, in the case at bar, has completely 
failed to show any causal connection between the re-
spondent's negligence operation of the light plant and 
the injuries sustained by the appellant. 
The appellant did not produce any direct evidence 
that the lights went out before or at the time of her 
fall, or that there were even any electric lights on in 
the hall or stairs at the time she started down the stairs. 
Let us consider the evidence of the appellant with 
r~spect to this proposition. Mrs. Carpenter, the appellant, 
testified as follows: "The lights went out and everything 
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",.as befuddled:· _-\s shown fron1 her testimony, (Tr. 
118, ~'-h. 40) she had no idea "'hatsoever as to the light-
ing condition either before or after the accident. We 
quote her testimony as follows from page 118 of the 
transcript: 
Q. But you did not see any globes burning any 
place did you? 
~-\.. I don't remember. 
Q. But you saw the hall was lighted? 
A.. Yes sir. 
Q. But you do not know where it came from? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Then so far as you know, it could have been 
coming from the sun's ray~? 
A. There might have been some light from the 
sun. 
Q. You haven't been there when one door was 
open? 
A. I do not know. 
Q. Is it possible for one door to have been open 
and lighted the hall? 
A. It might have been. 
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The appellant also testified, "That she was ill and re-
mained in her bed the entire day and night prior to the 
accident," (Tr. 100, Ab. 32) "and she does not remember 
whether she could see the steps on the stairs." (Tr. 104, 
Ab. 34.) 
The appellant testified that she came out of her 
room and across the hall to the head of the stairs as 
follows: "I put my hand on the post and went to take 
a step and the next thing I was rolling, the lights went 
out and everything was befuddled and everything went 
dark, and I found myself rolling (Tr. 91, Ab. 29) and (Tr. 
104, Ab. 34) she said she saw the first step but she 
doesn't know whether she stepped on the step or not. 
The question then arises as to the proximate cause 
of the fall. 
In view of her testimony to the effect that she 
placed her hand on the post and saw the first step, it 
is obvious that the alleged lack of artificial light was in 
no wise the proximate cause of her fall, on the contrary 
the fact of her illness coupled with her confusion as to 
the cause of her fall, the fact that she was befuddled and 
everything went dark (italics supplied) can lead to 
but one conclusion, that her illness caused the fall or 
was the proximate cause of the fall. The court, therefore, 
did properly grant the motion for a non-suit on the 
ground that the appellant failed in her burden to prove 
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any causal connection between the injuries suffered and 
the alleged negligence on the part of the respondent. 
PROPOSITION NlT~fBER THREE: 
The appellant was guilty of contributory negligence . 
. \ person ,\-ho goes down and across a hotel hall 
and starts down the stairs ,\-ithout stopping and looking 
to see if the stairs are lighted or are dark and as a result 
falls and is injured is guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law. 
The testimony of the appellant herself on cross 
examination coupled with the physical facts, clearly 
establishes the fact that she was guilty of contributory 
negligence. In this connection, the courfs attention is 
called to her testimony which was as follows: 
She does not remember whether or not she could 
see the steps on the stairs. (Tr. 102, Ah. 34) She could 
not tell if she missed a step or not. (Tr. 104, Ab. 34) She 
had no recollection at all as to the second step because 
she did not stop and. look as she started down the stairs. 
(Tr. 105, 106, Ah. 35.) As shown from her testimony we 
quote from the transcript page 105-106, Ah. 35: 
Q. Do you recall looking to see whether there 
was any light at the bottom of the stairs as 
you started down? 
A. I didn't have time to look. 
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Q. You stood there, didn't you? 
A. I didn't stop, I placed my hand on the post 
and started to take the first step, and the 
lights went out. 
Q. You didn't stop to see if there was any light 
coming up from the bottom of the stairs. 
xxx(Argument of Counsel) 
Q. Your recollection is, as I understand it now, 
is you do not recall ever having looked on 
this particular morning to see if there was 
any light coming up from the bottom of the 
stairway. (no answer.) 
Q. Do you understand the question? 
A. Yes, I know I didn't look. 
Q. You know you didn't look? 
A. No sir. 
Q. This is your recollection, that you did not 
look? 
A. There was a light when I started and so I 
went out and all of a sudden the light went 
out and I did not have any time to look. 
Q. Do you want the court and the jury to be-
lieve you came in a hurry out of this room 
and passed through that hall and put you 
hand on the post without stopping to look? 
A. Why shouldn't I? 
~nd (Tr. 10?, Ab. 35) she testified: 
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Q. You didn·t stop "·hen you arrived at the 
top of the stairway did you? 
A. No sir. 
She testified (Tr. 108 •. -\h. 36) that she saw the first 
step. and (Tr. 116 .. -\b. 39) she says that it was so dark 
she could not see the step, and (Tr. 109, Ab. 36) she says 
she kept her eyes on her foot. but she testified (Tr. 106, 
Ah. 35) that she did not look do"Tn the stairs. 
With the above review of evidence we submit that 
the plaintiff's testimony which can he no stronger than 
it is left on cross-examination, (Edwards vs. Clark, 96 
Ut. 121; 83 Pac. (2d) 1021) shows that she was guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. The case of 
DeHoney vs. Harding reported in 300 Fed. 696, is in 
point. The plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's hotel 
assigned to a second story room. The accident occurred 
at eight o'clock in the morning when it was full daylight. 
The plaintiff left her room in a diagonal course, crossed 
the carpet runner and stepped of into a descending stair-
way, fell and received the injuries of which she com-
plains. The descending stairway was shut off by a door 
at the lower end and therefore it was dark. The plain-
tiff had passed the descending stairs on numerous oc .. 
casions and was acquainted with the surroundings. At 
the close of the evidence the defendant moved for a di-
rected verdict upon the grounds that th,e evidence failed 
to establish negligence on the part of the defendant and 
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affirmatively showed that the plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence. The motion was sustained, judg-
ment entered for the defendant, and from that judgment 
the case was appealed, and was affirmed. The court in 
its opinion sets up the duties of an innkeeper towards 
his guests and gives an excellent definition of what is 
contributory negligence. On page ?'00 of the report the 
court holds as follows: 
"It appears from the evidence that the plain-
tiff, without any regard for her own safety, delib-
erately stepped from the lighted corridor into a 
darkened stairway, when, if she had used her 
eyes, she would have seen the stairway and 
avoided the accident. If she had left her room 
with her eyes closed, walked across the corridor, 
and stepped off into the stairway, no one would 
seriously contend that she was not guilty of negli-
gence which contributed to her injury. Her own 
testimony shows she practically did this thing. It 
seems clear that plaintiff simply hurried out of 
her room, and, without paying any attention to 
where she was going and without using her senses, 
walked into this darkened stairway. We cannot 
escape the conclusion that plaintiff, as a matter of 
law, was guilty of negligence which contributed 
to the proximate cause of the injuries for which 
she seeks recovery. Zvanovich vs. Gagnon & Co., 
45 Mont. 180, 122 Pac. 2?'2; Stanwood v. Clancy, 
106 Me. 72, 75 Atl. 293; 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213; 
Massey v. Seller et al., 45 Or. 26?, ?'? Pac. 397~ 
Johnson v. Ramberg, 49 Minn. 341, 51 N. W. 1043; 
Larned v. Vanderlinde, 165 Mich. 464, 131 N. W. 
165; Sparks v. Siebrecht et al, 19 App. Div. 11?, 
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45 .\. Y. ~upp. 991. Of cout·se if the defendant 
,,~as not guilty of actionable neglig·t'nee. plain-
tiffs negligence ,,~ns not strictly speaking, con-
tributory neglig:enee. but in either event the lower 
court propertly directed a verdict and the result 
is the same. 
"·The judgment is affirmed.·· 
Other cases supporting the contention of the respondent 
in this respect are: 
Cook Ys. McGillicuddy. (Main) 75 At. 378. 
Illinois Central Railroad Co. vs. Sanderson, 192 
s. w. 869. 
F. W. "-oolworth Co. vs. Davis, 41 Fed. (2d) 342. 
Johnson et al vs. ''T ashington Route Incorporated, 
209 Pac. 1100. 
Hendricks vs. Jones, (Ga.) 111 S. E. 81. 
Dempsey vs. Horton et al. (Mo.) 84 S. W. (2d) 621, 
page 625. 
~Iedcraft vs. ~1erchants Exchange, S. F. 211 Cal. 
404, 295 Pac. 822. 
Sullivan vs. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Mont.) 94 Pac. 
(2d) 651. 
Craft vs. Fordson Coal Co. (W. V.) 171 S. E. 886. 
Curtis vs. Capital Stage Line (Mo.) 27 S. W. (2d) 
747. 
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McVeagh vs. Bass, 110 Penn. Super. 379, 171 Atl. 
486. 
New York Tel. Co. vs. Beckers et al, 30 Fed. (2d) 
5?8. 
Blankertz vs. Mack & Co. et al, (Mich.) 248 N. W. 
889. 
Rice vs. Goodspeed Real Estate Co., 254 Michigan 
49; 235 N. W. 814. 
We submit, therefore, that in light of the evidence 
and the law as above set forth, the appellant was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and there-
fore, the court was obliged to grant the respondent's 
motion for a non-suit. 
Thompson on Trials-Vol 2, 2nd Edition, Sec. 1680, 
Page 1262: 
"Where an unavoidable inference of contri-
butory negligence arises out of plaintiff's own 
evidence, or out of evidence which stands undis-
puted in the case, the plaintiff must be either 
non-suited, xxx If, however, it appears without 
any conflict of evidence from plaintiff's own 
case, or from cross-examination of his witness that 
he was guilty of contributory negligence approx-
imately contributing to produce the injury, it 
would be the duty of the Court to take the case 
from the jury, by declaring as a matter of law, 
that the plaintiff cannot recover." 
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We respectfully submit therefore that the judgment 
should he sustained. 
H. D. LOWRY. 
CLA.RENCE c·. NESLEN. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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